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elimination of state and local consideration of the siting of a nuclear plant
in Polk County may result in NRC decisions based on information that the
state is in a better position to analyze. Similarly, state data collected pursuant
to the turnover agreement with the AEC may best be analyzed at the state
level.
The threat of protracted state hearings arising from an unsophisticated
examination of the dangers of radiation could cause reasonable concern in
the nuclear industry, but significant delays caused by public involvement in
hearings have not materialized." 0 The need for public understanding of both
the hazards and the benefits of nuclear power may present another important
reason to encourage additional exposure in state hearings of such issues.171
These policy considerations seem to favor a coordination of federal and
state roles in the siting of nuclear power plants.

7 2

In summary, there is no evidence of any congressional intent to preempt
any part of a state role in the siting of nuclear power plants in either the
text or the legislative history of the amended Atomic Energy Act. Courts
should not infer congressional intent to preempt a field without clear
evidence of the existence of such a purpose. Until Congress decides to
clarify the respective roles of the NRC and the states, the Atomic Energy Act
should be construed to give state authorities concurrent control over the
location of nuclear reactors, including the authority to consider issues related
to hazards posed by radiation.
ELIAS N.

CHOTAS

FLORIDA'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW: A RESTORATION
OF THE PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE?
A growing loss of confidence by voters in the American electoral system,
demonstrated by the apathetic response to elections of recent years, has been
attributed to the tremendous amounts of money spent in campaigns.' Every
year, more money is required to win an election. The effects of these skyregulate resultant safety hazards. 42 U.S.C. §2092 (1970); 10 C.F.R. §40.1 (1975). The
Bureau of Mines may only investigate and conduct safety-related research. 30 U.S.C. §187

(1970). See Selected Materials, supra note 27, at 395.
170. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 19, at 12-16, 78-79.
171. See Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: The Great
Delusion, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503 (1974). Public confusion over such issues may be
substantially eliminated by the proposed consolidation of state-NRC hearing procedures.
See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
172. The need for state-federal coordination in siting and the value of consolidation
of the necessary federal contacts into one agency for better coordination at the federal level
is emphasized in NRC,
PLANT SrrNG (July 1975).

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

1975

FEDERAL-STATE

CONFERENCE

ON

POWER

1. See, e.g., Adamany, Money in American Politics-The Costs of Campaigning,
21-2 VITAL ISSUES 1 (1971); Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for the
Smoke-Filled Rooms?, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631 (1972).
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rocketing costs have been the elimination of some candidates lacking great
personal wealth or wealthy supporters and the enhancement of the potential
for corruption of financially-pressed candidates by large contributors. This
potential for corruption has several facets. Heavily contributing persons and
groups expect the recipient candidate to reward their generosity with political
favors.2 At the same time, the candidate's dependency on wealthy donors to
furnish the requisite large campaign fund causes the candidate to feel that
he owes those donors special favors and access. 3 Further, the pressure on the
candidate to cultivate large contributors requires a great deal of his personal
time and effort, which detracts from the time he can spend campaigning.4
In the last two decades, Congress and almost all the states have passed
laws regulating campaign financing. 5 Analyzing these laws, commentators
have delineated the following four legislative goals: stemming the rising costs
of campaigns;" maximizing the distribution to the public of information about
the candidates; 7 equalizing the opportunity of every aspirant to political
office; 8 and reducing the potential for corruption by large contributors. 9
Theoretically, a law that achieves these four goals would be considered an
ideal regulation of a privately or publicly financed 10 electoral system.
2. Roady, Ten Years of Florida's "Who Gave It-Who Got It" Law, 27 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 434, 439-40 (1962) (large contributors expect not only favorable legislation
to their business, but also political prestige and special social invitations). See also Hearings
on S. 23 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on
Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 236, 262-64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings];Note, supra note 1, at 635-36.
3. "For too long great and decent individuals running for public office have been
forced to pander to large contributors, to degrade themselves, to ingratiate themselves with
the rich, and to place heavy demands on their friends, to behave in a manner which not

only humiliated themselves, not only compromised the office they sought but which was
inconsistent with the basic tenets of good government." Hearings, supra note 2, at 236 (remarks of Basil Patterson, Vice-Chairman, Democratic Nat'l Comm.).
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837-38 -(D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. All but four states - Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, and Rhode Island - regulate campaign
financing. The citations are collected and statutes compared in COUNCIL OF STATE GovFmXMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 42-47 (1974-75).
6. See, e.g., Roady, supra note 2, at 434; STAFF OF THE FLORIDA HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ELTrIONS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE POLITICS, SUMMARY
(Comm. Print
1973).
7. See, e.g., Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C. L. REv. 389, 456
(1973); Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARv. J. LEGis. 359, 360 (1972).
8. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 7; Roady, supra note 2, at 441. Cf. note 21 infra and
accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 236; Biden, Public Financing of Elections: Legis-

lative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1974).
10.

Public financing of elections is increasingly praised as the most effective means

of accomplishing these four goals. See, e.g., T. Scuw.ARTz, PUBLIC FINANCING Or ELECTIONS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF a
WEALTH 87-88 (1975); Biden, supra note 9; FLORIDA
HOUSE CoMMrEE ON ELECTIONS, supra note 6, pt. Ill. However, an extensive discussion
of the topic is beyond the scope of this work. The Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act, 26 U.S.C. §6096 (1970), as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. §§6096, 9001 et seq. (1975), provides

public funds for federal candidates through a voluntary income tax check-off system.
Whether public financing is feasible or desirable in Florida, however, cannot be considered
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In 1951, the Florida legislature set the pace of reform for other states by
passing a campaign finance law," which was replaced in 1973 with an even
more comprehensive act.1 2 This note discusses the pressures that led to legislative reform and then analyzes the effectiveness of the new Florida law. The
contribution limitations, expenditure limitations, disclosure requirements, and
enforcement provisions are described separately, focusing on the extent to
which they achieve the four stated goals and on their constitutional implications. Contained within this description is an analysis of the validity and
desirability of the four goals themselves. Suggestions for further reform appear
throughout the text and are appended in the form of a legislative proposal.
THE PROBLEM - RISING COSTS

The increasing cynicism of the electorate arises from a popular conviction
that the candidate with the most money will win. Validity may be added to
this popular conviction by a number of statistical studies that have demonstrated the increasing importance of a well-filled campaign chest to the
candidates in modern elections. In the 1970 campaigns for seats in the Florida
House of Representatives, the 82 winning candidates spent over $556,000; in
the same races in 1972, 109 winning candidates spent approximately twice as
much.' 3 Data concerning the Florida Democratic gubernatorial primaries show
that the average cost-per-vote in 1956 of $ .6314 rose to $ .79 in 1974.15 In the
same primaries, the average expenditure-per-candidate rose from $112,00016
to $167,000.7 This trend of rising costs in Florida is consistent with the
in terms of the federal approach. Public financing in Florida may be prohibitively expensive
simply because of administrative costs for a staff and computers; moreover, to these funds
must be added the sums disbursed to the candidates. Since Florida has no personal income
tax from which additional revenue could be voluntarily derived, public campaign financing
could not be easily added to the state budget. In addition, the impact of public financing is
unclear as to whether more candidates would participate, whether voter interest would
increase, and whether there would be less corruption. The availability of free money
might, in fact, encourage corruption and fraud. On balance, public financing may not
promote the goals of campaign finance laws sufficiently to justify the additional effort and
expense.
A final question that leaves the legislative future of public financing seriously in
doubt is whether the voters want such a law. An informal poll conducted in 1974 by
the Florida Democratic Party indicated that only 25% of the sample responded favorably
to public financing. Interview with John French, former Staff Director of the Florida
House Committee on Elections, in Tallahassee, Oct. 28, 1975. This committee drafted the
Florida Campaign Finance Act.
11. Fla. Laws 1951. ch. 51-26819 at 631, codified as FLX. STAT. §99.161 (1951).
12. FLA. STAT. §§106.011 et seq. (1975).
13. The winning candidatEs spent $1,162,000. FLORIDA HOUS. COMMITrEE ON ELEcTioNS,
supra note 6, pt. I, Table I. Thus, in 1970, the winning candidates spent an average of
approximately $6,780 and in 1972, an average of approximately $10,650. See also note 21
infra.
14. Roady. supra note 2, at 435. See also Note, Campaign Spending Regulation: Failure
of the First Step, 8 HARV. J. LEGis. 640, 642 (1971).
15. A. MoRRIs, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 537-41 (1975-76).
16. Roady, supra note 2, at 443.
17. Momuus, supra note 15, .t537-41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 7
1976]

FLORIDA'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

national trend. The total amount of money spent in all elections in the
United States rose from $155 million in 1956 to $400 million in 1972.18
Many reasons have been advanced to explain these rising costs. In addition to the obvious effects of inflation, 9 modern public relations and
advertising techniques based on a massive use of the electronic communications media contribute significantly to the rising costs. 20 This massive use of
media is based on the theory that the candidate with the most money can
buy the most advertising through which he may project his desired image
and thereby attract the most voters.21 Higher costs also result from increases
in population, which expand the electorate and provide greater competition
from more candidates. 22 Because of this increased competition, more money
23
must often be spent by a candidate just to achieve individual recognition.
Increased campaign expenses may also arise from the decline of political
party organizations accompanied by the emergence of voter independence.2 4
One commentator has blamed short terms of office for causing incumbents to
25
spend constantly to ensure their re-election.
The rising cost of campaigns poses a dual threat to a democratic system.
The difficulty encountered by a non-wealthy candidate in waging an effective
campaign violates the democratic premise that every person should have an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 26 In addition, the
18. See Fleishman, supra note 7. at 392 n.16 and accompanying text; Note, supra note
1, at 631-34.
19. Roady, supra note 2, at 443.
20. Note, supra note 1, at 631-34.
ON

21. Empirical data supports this conviction to some degree. FLORIDA HOUSE COMMrrrEE
EtLzcsoNs, supra note 6, pt. I, at 6; Roady, supra note 2, at 435. Neither of these studies,

however, found complete consistency. While the Elections Committee reported that 63%
of the winning candidates outspent their opponents in 1970, the figure rose to 71% in 1972.
Roady found that the candidate with the most money won but that the order of finish
among the winner's opponents was not dependent on the amount of money they spent. The
correlation of money and success has also been challenged with the contention that there
is a point of diminishing returns. "Legislators and judges have often agreed that 'excessive'
campaign expenditures are harmful. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the influence
exerted on the voter by the tremendous sums poured into political propaganda ...
[B]eyond a certain point money spent to reach the electorate may not produce an intelligent
response; too much propaganda might in fact dull voter interest in elections." Note,
Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds, 66 HArv. L. REV. 1259, 1259-60 (1953).
The same observation was made by Roady, supra note 2, at 434, but he concluded that
candidates are still "reluctant to leave any stone unturned."

22. Adamany, supra note 1, at 2.
23. Note, supra note 14, at 643-44.
24. Adamany, supra note 1, at 2.
25. COMMITEE FOR ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM 18
(Comm. Print 1968). The authors hypothesize that a Congressman, holding office for only
two years, feels an immediate need to begin campaigning for re-election.-As a result, he
spends for a longer period of time and at an increasing rate in order to maintain a
high profile.
26. "The goal of enriching the electoral system, through broadening the base of
citizen influence and reducing inequities in the opportunities of candidates and their
supporters to persuade the electorate, is a worthy one; it is not only consistent with but
indispensable to the attainment of the most fundamental purposes of the Constitution."

Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 360.
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need for large amounts of money places pressure on the non-wealthy candidate
to seek out wealthy contributors 27 who may expect legislative benefits "more
equal" than those obtained by the average constituent. Over the years,
numerous scandals have resulted from the inability of some candidates and
public officials to resist the pressure created by the need for campaign funds.
While Florida citizens were shocked in 1948 by revelations of gangster money
permeating the gubernatorial election,2 8 those events pale in comparison to
the nation's suffering under the impact of "Watergate" with respect to
campaign financing and corruption.

29

Legislation against corrupt practices has existed in Florida since 1913,30
but the success with which it has been enforced has varied.3 1 In 1951 public
pressure resulting from the rising costs of campaigns and the 1948 disclosures
of political corruption led to the passage of the "Who gave it-Who got it"
law,32 section 99.161 of the Florida Statutes. 33 Section 99.161 added the following three significant provisions to the existing laws:3 4 limits on individual
contributions, requirements that the campaign treasurer authorize all expenditures on the candidate's behalf, and reports from the candidate on all
his contributions and expenditures.2 5 Because of these provisions, section
99.161 received high praise for its potential to reduce corruption.3 6
THE FLORIDA CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACT OF

1973

In 1973, section 99.161 was repealed and replaced by a comprehensive
27. Biden, supra note 9, at 2-5. The author, a freshman United States Senator from
Delaware, recounts his own experiences of this pressure during his campaign in 1974.
28. Roady, supra note 2, at 436.
29. "Beyond any doubt, the year-long revelations of Watergate demonstrate the insidious
influence of private money in American politics. When some of the most distinguished
corporations in the Nation confess to crimes involving blatant violations of the existing
Federal election laws, we begin to understand the irresistible pressures that are corrupting
our national life. If 1972 was unique at all in campaign financing, it was unique only in
the unscrupulous intensity and efficiency with which the contributions were so successfully
solicited." The Question of Federal Financing of National Election Campaigns: Pro & Con,
CONG. DIGEsT

30. FLA.

48 (February 1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
§104.061 (1975).

STAT.

81. Roady, supra note 2, at 436-37.
32. Id. This name for the 1951 Florida law was coined by Roady to refer to the law's
disclosure requirements.
33. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, at 631, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.161 (1951).
34. Existing laws dated from 1897 and consisted of a prohibition of corporate contributions, Fla. Laws 1897, ch. 97-4538, codified as FLA. STAT. §104.091 (1951); corrupt practices
sanctions, FLA. STAT. §104.061 ([975) (originally enacted as Fla. Laws 1913, ch. 13-6470, §3, at
268); and a specific designation of items on which campaign funds could be spent, Fla. Laws
1951, ch. 51-26870, §3, at 887, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.172 (1951). Section 99.172 originated
in Fla. Laws 1913, ch. 13-6470, §1, at 268, to apply to all elections. Sections 99.172 and
104.091 were repealed by the Florida Campaign Finance Act, Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-128.
at 210. The corrupt practices statute, §104.061, is still in force.
85. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §§2, 7, 8, at 632-35. See also Andrews, Regulation of
Campaign Expenditures,27 FLA. B.J. 15 (1953).
36. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 7, at 451; Roady, supra note 2, at 445; Note, Campaign Spending Controls Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 8 COLUN. J.
LAw & Soc. PROn. 285, 295 (1972).
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new law known as the Florida Campaign Finance Act of 197337 (Florida Act).
The new Act revised the former provisions relating to contribution limits,
campaign treasurers' responsibilities, and disclosure procedures, and added
sections on definitions, expenditure limits, 3s and enforcement procedures. As
a result of these additions, the candidate can more clearly understand his
duties concerning his campaign funds and thus may comply with them more
easily.39 To the degree to which the Florida Act achieves the four goals 40 of an
ideal campaign finance law, the Act clearly represents an important step
toward the ultimate objective of restoring public confidence in the integrity
of the electoral system, but public confidence could be further restored by
additional revision of certain provisions.
LIMITATIONS ON CONTRMUTIONS

Maximum limits on campaign contributions minimize the potential for
corruption by large donors by simply eliminating large donations. No person
or political committee is permitted to make contributions or loans aggregating
more than $1,000 to any candidate running for office or to any political
committee supporting or opposing an issue or candidate to be voted on in the
state.41 The first primary, second primary, and general election are treated
as separate elections, which raises the individual contributor's potential
maximum to $3,000 in one election year.4 2
The definition of "person" includes both individuals and combinations of
individuals having collective capacity.43 A "political committee" is a combination of two or more individuals having as its purpose the support or opposition of any candidate, issue, or political party and which, for that purpose,
accepts contributions or makes expenditures of more than $500 in a calendar
year.44 The Florida Act broadly defines "contribution" as a "gift, subscription,
conveyance, deposit, payment, or distribution of money or anything of value,
including contributions in kind having an attributable monetary value in
37. FLA. STAT. §§106.011 et seq. (1975) (originally enacted as Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73128, at 210).
38. Fla. Laws 1913, ch. 13-6470, at 268, placed limits on total expenditures, but these
limitations were repealed by Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 49-25273, at 637, as unenforceable. Roady,

supra note 2, at 436.
39. Stiff penalties for violations are provided in each section of the Florida Act, as
compared to being in a separate chapter, FLA. ST.AT. §104.27 (1971), prior to 1973. The

penalties encompass civil fines as well as criminal penalties. See text accompanying notes
231-235 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
41. FLA. STAT. §106.08(1) (1975). This $1,000 limit actually applies to candidates in any
election for office that is not statewide, including candidates for municipal office. Op. A-rr'y
GEN. FLA. 074-263 (1974). The limit is extended to $3,000 for candidates for statewide
office, including United States Senator, and for political committees participating in
statewide elections. FLA. STAT. §106.08(1)(c), (d) (1975).
42. FLA. STAT. §106.08(1) (1975).
43. Id. §106.011(7).
44. Id. §106.011(2). "Political committee" does not include committees of continuous
existence, as defined in FLA. STAT. §106.04 (1975), or political parties regulated by FLA. STAT.
§103 (1975). "Corporations regulated by [FLA. STAT. §§607, 613, 617 (1975)] are not political
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any form, made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election. ' '4 5
This definition includes transfers from one political committee to another
and payments by an independent third person to one who provides goods
or services to a candidate without charge. 46 Whether the meaning of "contribution" encompasses loans is not clear47 but since the limitations imposed on
both contributions and loans are the same 48 the distinction is insignificant.
A simple amendment adding "loan" to the definition of "contribution"
would solve this problem.

49

The Florida Act carries over the provision from the previous finance law 5°
requiring any contribution received less than five days prior to the election
to be returned to the contributor. 51 Placing a final date on the opportunity
to contribute ensures that the candidate has adequate time to process and
report all contributions. 52 Thus, the public receives the candidate's last preelection report the day before the election 53 and may judge for itself the influence of various contributors.
Exceptions to Limitations
The Florida Act's contribution limits do not cover several sources of
valuable "contributions." First, the Florida Act does not limit the candidate's
use of his personal funds.54 Although this exception does not impede the
committees if their political activities are limited to contributions to candidates or political
committees from corporate funds and if no contributions are received by such corporations."
FLA. STAT. §106.011(2) (1975). Apparently, these entities are excluded because the contribution and reporting requirements applicable to them differ slightly from the general rules.
Committees of continuous existence are subjected by §106.04(5) to the same contribution limits enumerated in §106.08(1). (Political parties may make unlimited contributions,
but these must be reported by the recipient. FLA. STAT. §106.29(4).) The definition of "person" expressly includes corporations, FLA. STAT. §106.011(7); thus, a regular business corporation is limited by §106.08(1). Committees of continuous existence file reports at the same
time as candidates for less than statewide office, FLA. STAT. §106.04(4), but do not have to
use authorization vouchers required of ordinary political committees for all expenditures.
Political parties need only file once a month after the date on which the candidate
qualifies rather than twice a month or more. FLA. STAT. §106.29(1). Business corporations
do not file reports at all.
45. FLA. STAT. §106.011(3) (1975).
46. Id. §§106.011(3)(b), (c).

47. The general descriptive terms of FLA. STAT. §§106.011(3)(a), see text accompanying
note 45 supra, can reasonably be interpreted to include loans. However, two other sections
expressly add language pertaining to loans. Section 106.05 requires a detailed statement
from the treasurer listing persons "contributing or providing" funds (emphasis added) to
accompany all deposits. Section 106.08(1) states: "No person . . . shall make contributions
...in moneys, material, or supplies or by way of loan, in excess ..
" (emphasis added).
If "contribution" included loans, these phrases would be unnecessary. Nevertheless, these
phrases could be read either way and may have been added to emphasize legislative intent.
48. See note 47 supra.
49.

See

APPENDIX § I

infra.

50. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §4(b), at 634, codified as FLA.
51. FLA. STAT. §106.08(2) (1975).
52. Roady, supra note 2, at 438.
53. FLA. STAT. §106.07(1) (1975).
54. Id. §106.08(l).
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contribution limits' effect on special interest groups, it does nothing to further
the goal of equal financing for all candidates. The wealthy candidate has
a great advantage because he can bring in substantial amounts of cash at
the outset of his campaign to hire the best staff, make deposits on prime
media spots, and plan his overall campaign. 55
An alternative solution to the problem of this disparity would be to place
the same limits on candidates as on other contributors; however, the United
States Supreme Court has found this limitation to be an unconstitutional
infringement of the candidate's right of access to the political system.56
Although the Florida Act allows the candidate to contribute without limit,
family members appear to be governed by the regular limits. By not including
family contributions within the exception, the Florida Act may have attempted
to minimize the disparity between wealthy and poor candidates since it is
57
often not the candidate but his family who is wealthy.
A second potentially valuable source of unlimited contributions is the use
of volunteers' services. The value of "services provided without compensation
by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time on behalf of a
candidate or political committee" is not included as a contribution. 58 Travel
expenses incurred by the volunteer in rendering his services are probably
excluded, although other incidental expenses may not be.59 Essentially, this
exception permits people to contribute their time, but not their money,
without restriction. The candidate is saved from computing the value of the
time given by his campaign workers and can obtain an especially valuable
asset if the volunteer has a particularly useful skill. 0 An example would
be a volunteer who is an accountant. The Florida Act requires extensive reporting of all incoming and outgoing funds. Payments by a candidate to an
55. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56. The Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §608(a)(1) (1975), attempted to
attain the goal of equalizing wealthy and poor candidates by placing a relatively high
total on the amount a candidate could contribute to himself but permitting the candidate's
family to contribute a part or all of this total. Thus, a wealthy candidate could collect
only so much money from his relatives before he reached his maximum, but the poorer
candidate could rely on all of his relatives to contribute varying amounts unhindered by
the regulation limitations.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), however, the Supreme Court held that any
limitation on the candidate's personal contributions would be unconstitutional. In reaching
its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the use of personal funds reduced the potential for
corruption and that equalizing wealthy and poor candidates impinged on the individual
candidate's right of free expression. "The candidate, no less than any other person, has a
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and
tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates." Id. at 651. The
Supreme Court also noted that the Court of Appeals and the Federal Elections Commission
had improperly construed the meaning of §608(a)(1); Congress actually had intended that
family members be limited to the regular contribution limits unless the funds were given
to the candidate before he became a candidate. Id. at 650 n.57.

57. See generallyNote, supra note 36, at 508-09.
58. FA. STAT. §106.011(3)(c) (1975).
59. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 052-22 (1952), construing Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §2, at632, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.161(2) (1951), a similar provision imposing contribution limits.
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., dissenting).
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accountant who prepares these reports must be counted toward the expenditures limitA1 Yet, if that accountant volunteered his services to prepare
the reports, such a "contribution" would seem to be excepted under the
Florida Act. Similarly, a celebrity who volunteers his time on behalf of a
candidate could be giving time worth much more than $1,000 on the commercial market and many times that in publicity for the candidate.
The Federal Election Campaign Act G2 (Federal Act), which regulates
federal elections in a similar manner as does the Florida Act, contains a
similar section regarding volunteers. The Federal Act, however, expressly
excepts all incidental expenses incurred by the volunteers, such as expenditures
for food and beverages furnished at a party given by the volunteer for the
candidate.6 3 Abuse of this exception for incidental expenditures is avoided by
placing a maximum cumulative limit of $500 on such expenses; expenses
above $500 are counted as contributions to the candidate. 64 Although both
the federal and Florida provisions require picayune accounting details concerning contributions and expenditures, the Federal Act is less burdensome
administratively since it does not regulate volunteers' expenses until they
become significant. Most volunteers probably will never reach the reporting
limit. An amendment to the Florida Act, employing the federal approach,
65
would clearly be an improvement.
Despite the value the candidate may receive in the above situations, the
allowance of unlimited volunteers' services does not particularly offend any
of the goals of campaign finance legislation. Of course, the volunteer system
could be abused if the volunteers expected post-election favors or if an
organization, such as a union, commanded its entire membership to
"volunteer" for a particular candidate. 66 Despite these potentials for abuse,
an inquiry into each volunteer's motives is impractical. Ideally, the number
and quality of the volunteers a candidate receives reflects his popularity and
support. 67
A third source of unlimited funds is political parties that may contribute
as much as they desire to their own candidates.68 The only limits placed on
the parties are the same as those placed on the candidates' personal funds:
limits on the candidates' total expenditures. Again, however, little concern
about the possibility of corruption is justified because support from a part)
seems as innocuous as support from personal funds. While the language of the
61. Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 074-252 (1974).
62. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C. (Supp.
1 1972)), as amended, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 27, 47 U.S.C.A. (1975)).
63. 18 U.S.C.A. §591(e)(5) (1975).
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65. See APPENDIX §1 infra.

66.

CONG. DIGEST,

supra note 29, at 49.

67. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652-53 (1976).
68. FLA. STAT. §106.08(1) (1975) excepts political party contributions from the contribution limits. This exception may be qualified by §106.29(4), which refers to unlimited
contributions in the general election. The latter section, however, does not appear exclusive
in its application. See note 69 infra.
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Florida Act seems to allow a political party to favor one of its candidates
with unlimited funds in the primaries, 69 the Act expressly contemplates party
expenditures that do not directly benefit one candidate. Under sections
106.021(4) and 106.10(4), an expenditure made for the purchase of media
advertising jointly endorsing six or more candidates is not counted as a
contribution or expenditure for any of those candidates. By implication, an
expenditure for fewer than six candidates would have to be allocated among
them.
Loopholes- Past andPresent
One problem that arose under the former law appears to have been
solved by the new Florida Act. The old law defined a "candidate" merely
as a person who had announced his candidacy.70 In Ervin v. Capitol Weekly
Post,71 certain persons bought advertising to encourage a former governor to
run again for that office. The Attorney General of Florida brought an action
to enjoin such advertising under a section of the law providing that no money
could be spent for campaign purposes prior to the time the candidate
announced his candidacy or qualified 2 The Ervin court denied the relief
sought on the ground that the former governor was not a "candidate" within
the meaning of the statute,7 3 noting:
It may well be that the members of the Legislature did not visualize an
active advertising campaign by numerous citizens to induce an individual
to become a candidate. If this be assumed it does not give the Courts
This argument may be fortified
the power to add to the statute ....
by a consideration of the fact that the Legislature did fix a date far
in advance of the primary elections by which each person to be voted
upon must qualify as a candidate . . . 4
The Ervin holding suggested that a person could make unlimited expenditures
urging a candidacy, as long as the candidate was not formally recognized. The
Florida Act broadly defines "candidate" as any person who has filed his
qualification papers, accepted contributions, made expenditures, "or given
his consent for any other person to receive contributions or make expenditures,
with a view to bringing about his nomination or election to public office in
69. Id. Compare the pertinent language of §106.08(1): "The contribution limits pro-

vided . .. shall not apply to contributions made by political parties regulated by chapter
103 or to amounts contributed .... " with the pertinent language of §106.29(4): "Mhe
contribution of funds by one executive committee to another, to established party organizations for legitimate party or campaign purposes, or to individual candidates of that party
in general elections in amounts exceeding [the limits] shall not be prohibited, but all
such contributions shall be recorded. ..- ."
70. Fla. Laws 1951, d. 51-2870, §3, at 837 repealed, Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-378, §1, at
1298.

71. 97 So. 2d 464 (Fa. 1957).
72. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 55-29936, §1, at 897, codified as FLA.
73. 97 So. 2d at 469-70.

STAT.

§99.161(4) (1955).

74. Id. at 469.
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this state."75 Additionally, another provision prohibits virtually all expenditures "directly or indirectly in furtherance of any candidacy" prior to the
time the candidate files the papers necessary to qualify for office.-- These two
provisions preclude the recurrence of the Ervin situation or other evasion of
the contribution limits by supporting a "non-candidate."
Although the new act closes one loophole, contribution limits might still
be circumvented by the use of independent committees. Because the Florida
Act sets no limits on total political contributions 7 or on the number of committees supporting the same candidate to which one person can contribute, a
single contributor could give $1,000 each to numerous committees supporting
his candidate and numerous committees opposing his candidate's opponent. 5
Despite this potential evasion of the limits, the chance of its occurrence and
the actual threat of corruption seem remote. Even though the candidate's reports would not reflect the real sources of all the contributions, the committees' reports would. Adverse publicity resulting from disclosure, combined
with the inconvenience of channeling many small contributions to different
committees, would probably discourage the potential multiple contributor.
Since committees are similarly limited to a 51,000 contribution per candidate,
no individual political committee can exert much financial influence.79 A
simpler, more direct way of avoiding the application of the contribution limits
would be for the interested contributor to make independent expenditures
supporting the favored candidate. Despite the avoidance of contribution

75. FLA. STAT. §106.011(1) (1975). This definition has been construed to include any
office filled by the voters of this state; thus, it excludes only presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 074-23 (1974).
76. FLA. STAT. § 106.15(1) (1975).
77. See 18 U.S.C.A. §608(b)(3) (1975), providing that no individual shall make
contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any calendar year.
78. An example may clarify this evasion device: Candidates X and Y are running against
each other for the state legislature. Contributor wishes to give as much as possible to X. Under
FiA. STAT. §106.08(1), Contributor may give $1,000 to X, $1,000 each to Committees A,
B, C, etc. (all of whose purpose is to "Elect X") and $1,000 each to Committees 1, 2, 3, etc.
(all of whose purpose is to "Stop Y"). Although Committees A, B, C, etc. could not contribute more than $1,000 each to X under §106.08, the Florida Act contains no explicit
provisions regulating "anti-issue" committees such as the "Stop Y" committees.
79. Another provision in the Florida Act may also discourage evasion of limits via
multiple committees. Section 106.08(3), carried over from Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 55-29936, §I,
codified as FLA. STAT. §99.161(4) (1955), prohibits any person from making a contribution
in support of a candidate or issue, "through or in the name of another, directly or indirectly." This language has not been interpreted in Florida but appears to eliminate the
problem of "earmarking." This is a device through which a contributor gives money to a
committee supporting a number of candidates but specifies the candidate to whom he wants
the money to go, which circumvents limits on his direct contributions. Fleishman, supra
note 4, at 432. The Federal Act contains a specific provision that earmarked contributions
shall be treated as contributions to the candidate. 18 U.S.C.A. §608(b)(6) (1975). The Federal
Act also has a provision similar to the Florida Act's §106.08(3), but it is more narrowly
drawn to prohibit only the fraudulent use of another's name in contributing. 18 U.S.C.A.
§614 (1975). The language of the Florida statute is broad enough to cover both of these
occurrences, but its breadth also results in ambiguity.
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limits that this scheme allows, a federal act that limited independent expenditures was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 0
ConstitutionalImplications
The general concept of limitations on contributions has long been
questioned by commentators because of possible constitutional impediments.
Strict constructionists contend that contribution limits impinge on first
amendment rights of free speech and association by impeding the contributor's
ability to communicate with others as he wishes. 8' Proponents of the limitations
argue that a balancing approach is tenable.
[The right to communicate freely and the right to be heard] are not
absolute, and determination of the constitutionality of restrictions upon
them requires a weighing of the interest sacrificed against the goals and
values sought to be achieved.... Campaign contributions serve primarily
to pay for seeking to persuade the electorate. . . .Spending money is
not the same as speech-making, even if the former may foster the
latter.... Both speaking and spending may be protected by the first
amendment; but the degree of protection accorded need not necessarily

be held to be identical.82

Contribution limits have not been directly challenged in the Florida
courts, but their constitutionality has recently been settled by the Supreme
Court. In Buckley v. Valeo,s3 Senator James Buckley and others sued the
Secretary of the Senate and a number of other federal officials.8 4 The plaintiffs
were seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the key
provisions of the Federal Act 5 relating to limitations on and disclosure of
contributions and expenditures and to the public financing of presidential
campaigns. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Senator Buckley and his
colleagues first argued that "contributions and expenditures are at the very
core of political speech, and that the [Federal] Act's limitations thus constitute
restraints on First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct."' ' 6 The
Court replied:
[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal
80. Bucldey v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 640, 647 (1976). The Federal Act had attempted
to deal with this situation by placing a $1,000 limit on direct contributions to the candidate
and another $1,000 limit on the expenditures an individual may make on the candidate's
behalf without the candidate's authorization. 18 U.S.C.A. §608(b)(4), (e)(1) (1975). See text
accompanying notes 119-146 infra.
81. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-310, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48 (1973) (views of Senator
Claiborne Pell); Ferman, Congressional Control on Campaign Financing: An Expansion or
Contraction of the First Amendment?, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 8-12 (1972).
82. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 372-73.
83. 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
84. A full identification of the parties is made in the Circuit Court opinion, 519 F.2d
at 834 n.4.
85. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
86. Bucldey v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 633 (1976).
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restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. .

.

. The quantity of communication by the contributor does

not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the
expression8 7 rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.
The appellants next contended that the underlying purpose of contribution
limits could have been achieved with less interference with first amendment
rights by using "less drastic means," 88 such as disclosure and reporting requirements. 89 The Court rejected this argument because Congress had passed
contribution limits after determining that reporting requirements alone would
not be adequate protection against the undue influence of large contributors.90
Those limits are a matter of legislative discretion and within congressional
power. 91 With the precedent set by the Buckley opinion 9 2 and the legislative
intent underlying the Florida Act, 93 there is ample evidence to conclude that
the Florida Act's contribution limits are constitutional.
LuIITATIONS ON EXPENDITURES

The Florida Act defines an "expenditure" as a "purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, or gift of money or anything of value made for the
purpose of influencing the results of an election."9 4 Modeled in theory on the
Federal Act, 95 section 106.10 sets the maximum amount a candidate may
spend for each primary and general election for each office. 98 For example,
87. Id. at 635.
88. The doctrine of "less drastic means" was derived from Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960), wherein the Court said: "In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same purpose." Id. at 488.
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 639 (1976).
90. Id. at 640.
91. id. Congressional power to regulate first amendment rights to a certain degree is wellestablished. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954): United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The exercise
of legislative discretion in ascertaining the amount at which to set contribution limits is a
greater problem than legislative power. The limits must be low enough not to suggest
undue influence yet high enough that the candidate will not waste the large amount of
time required to raise funds by collecting only small amounts. See generally AMERICAN ENTERI-RISE

INSTITUTE,

CAMPAIGN

FINANCES-

Two VIEWS OF TIlE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

IMPLICATIONS (1971); Congress Watch, Statement on S. 372 and Proposed Amendments
(Comm. Print 1973).
92. See also Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166, 169-70 (Fla. 1953). See text accompanying
notes 124-126 infra.
93. See FLORIDA HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, supra note 6, at Summary; Roady,
supra note 2, at 436-37.
94. FLA. STAT. §106.011(4) (1975).
95. Interview with John French, supra note 10.
96. FLA. STAT. §106.10(2) makes these limits inapplicable to candidates for the United
States Congress or Senate as long as the Federal Act applies to them. See also 18 U.S.C.A.
§608(c)(1) (1975). The law in Florida prior to 1973, Fla, Laws 1953, ch. 53-28156, §13, at
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a candidate for the state senate may spend $25,000 for the first primary,
$15,000 for the second primary, and $25,000 for the general election. 97 Limits
on expenditures reduce, or at least stabilize, the cost of campaigning and ensure that the ability to run successfully for political office will no longer be
heavily dependent on a large campaign purse. 9
In order to ensure uniformity in the required reports, the Florida Act
sets forth procedures whereby all expenditures, "directly or indirectly made
or received in furtherance of the candidacy of any person," 99 must be
channeled through a primary campaign depository 00 and authorized on a
voucher form by the campaign treasurer.' 0 ' The vouchers must state the
amount of funds authorized, the nature of the goods or services to be
received for that consideration, and that such amount will not exceed the
permissible expenditure limits. 102 The person receiving the authorization
voucher must certify its validity and then present it to the campaign depository
for payment.20 3 Although this procedure seems complex, it was found to be a
necessary means of implementing the reporting provisions. 04
Certain types of expenditures are particularly restricted under the Florida
Act. The maximum amount a candidate may pay for advertising is the lowest
local rate available to any commercial advertiser; this limitation results from
the fact that the Florida Act limits the amount owners of mass media
facilities are permitted to charge a "candidate for state or county public
office.'1 0 5 A candidate may not pay for polls or surveys, and a person may
not solicit funds from a candidate for polls or surveys, unless conducted under
the candidate's direct supervision or that of a professional polling organization
hired by him.106 Finally, until a candidate has qualified for office, no person,
candidate, political party, or political committee, "directly or indirectly in
566, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.172 (1953), did not limit expenditures as does §106.10 but

specifically designated the items on which campaign funds could be spent, e.g., radio advertising, travel, etc. This enumeration was originally part of Fla. Laws 1913, ch, 13-6470, §1,
at 268, and applied only to primary elections but was amended by the 1953 Session Law, id.,
to apply to all elections. This specific designation was probably dropped in 1973 because
it was no longer practical to list all the goods and services on which campaign funds could
justifiably be spent.
97. FLA. STAT. §106.10(1)(c) (1975).
98. See, e.g., FLORIDA HOUSE COMMITEE ON ELtcrioNs, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 6; Fleishman, supra note 7, at 457; Roady, supra note 2, at 441.
99. FLA. STAT. §106.021(4) (1975).
100. Id. §§106.11, .13. Petty cash expenditures for less than $20, which are not used
to buy media advertising, do not need to be channeled through a primary campaign depository or authorized by the campaign treasurer. Id. §106.12.
101. Id. §106.14. A similar provision under the old law, Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §7,
at 634, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.161(7) (1951), was upheld in Schaal v. Race, 135 So. 2d
252 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (a provider of advertising services pursuant to an oral contract
was denied recovery in his suit for payment).
102. FLA. STAT. §106.11(1) (1975).

103.

Id. §106.11(2).

104. Schaal v. Race, 135 So. 2d 252, 255-58 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), citing Smith v. Ervin,
54 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 1953). See text accompanyin- note 124 infra,
105.

FLA. STAT. §106.16 (1975).

106.

Id. §106.17.
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furtherance of any candidacy," is permitted to advertise in printed or electronic
10 7
media or to rent an auditorium for a political speech.
Some expenditures appear to be excepted from the limitations imposed
by the Florida Act. For instance, incidental expenditures made by volunteers
in rendering their services do not appear to be counted as expenditures under
the Florida Act.'0 8 Similarly, a future candidate may incur travel, incidental,
and limited campaign expenses prior to qualifying for office without it
being counted toward his expenditure limitations.19 But any reimbursement
of the candidate or volunteers from campaign funds would probably be an
expenditure since it would come from the campaign depositor), or petty
cash." 0
Excess Contributions
The Florida Act provides that contributions to the candidates in excess
of the allowable expenditure limitations escheat to the state,"' This provision takes on added significance in view of the problems concerning the
constitutionality of the expenditure limitations. The Florida Act seems to
contemplate that part of the total contributions collected within the expenditure limits may not be spent by the time the campaign ends because it
requires periodic reporting of unexpended balances." 2 The Act fails, however,
to prescribe what the candidate, whether elected, may do with the funds that
do not escheat but are not actually expended.
This question of the candidate's disposal of funds contributed in excess
of his actual expenditures arose under the previous Florida law."' Under that
law, the attorney general opined that since the campaign was over, the
excess funds could be withdrawn on "the candidate's certification that he is
unopposed and is withdrawing the funds for his own personal use."' 1 4 He
reiterated this opinion just after the Florida Act was passed but emphasized
that he was still dealing with the prior law and did not intend to "pass upon
107. Id. §106.15. See also text accompanying notes 71-76 supra. Although "candidate"
is broadly defined, this section narrowly defines candidate for purposes of media expenditures.
108. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.
109. The former law, Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 55-29936, §1, at 897, codified as FLA. STAT.
§99.172 (1955), expressly permitted pre-qualification travel and incidental expenditures. The
Florida Act merely prohibits significant advertising expenditures. FLA. STAT. §106.15 (1975).
Since the limits imposed by §106.10 apply only to candidates, the minimal expenditures
permitted prior to qualifying for office would not be subject to the limitations.
110. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
I11. FLA. STAT. § 106.10(3) (1975).
112. Id. §106.07(5).
113. Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 072-307 (1972). This Opinion, however, dealt with a situation
in which a candidate wished to hold present contributions for future campaign expenses.
The Attorney General expressly refused to opine whether funds could be used solely for
personal purposes but found that nothing in the law actually prohibited such use. The
issue of campaign funds in excess of expenditure limits never arose under the previous law
since that law contained no such limits.
114. See note 113 supra.
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any questions that might arise or exist under the 1973 revision of the
Code."11s
Despite the attorney general's disclaimer, the new Act would likely receive
a similar interpretation. Return of the excess funds would be difficult. Since
all incoming funds are mingled for purposes of disbursements, it would be
impractical, if not impossible, to determine whose contributions were unspent. Pro rata division would be so nominal as to be meaningless. By requiring these excess funds to be reported until the account is empty, the
Florida Act implies that they will be reduced over time." 6 Although the
statute does not prescribe any means for this reduction, any official or
charitable purpose would seem an appropriate and reasonable use." 7 An
express provision to this effect should be added to the Florida Act."'Limitationson Expenditures- ConstitutionalImplications
Limitations on expenditures have not escaped criticism on constitutional
grounds."19 A citizen's first amendment rights of free speech and association
are impinged on when expenditure limitations prevent him from communicating his political views to the public to the full extent of his ability.
Similarly, the public loses its right to benefit from a full discussion of the
issues. Although expenditure limits are not entirely new to Florida, 120 the
specific issue of their constitutionality has not been dealt with by the Florida
courts. Two provisions of the Florida Act requiring close constitutional
scrutiny are the requirement of treasurer authorization for all expenditures
and the expenditure limits themselves. The Florida supreme court's reasoning
in an early case would suggest a conclusion that these two provisions would be
valid, 121 but the Buckley decision commands a different result.
Non-CandidateExpenditures
Under the Florida Act' 2 ' and its predecessor statute,1" 3 no expenditure
may be made by either the candidate or an unconnected third person without
Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-221 (1973).
116. FLA. STAT. §106.07(5) requires supplemental statements to be filed after the election showing unexpended funds. "Such supplemental statements shall be filed every sixty
days until the account shows no unexpended balance of contributions." Id. This seems to
create a presumption that these funds will somehow be spent.
117. Public policy would suggest that candidates not be permitted to use funds for
personal purposes. Such permission could lead to individuals qualifying for candidacy with
the primary intent to raise, but not spend, funds in their campaign. But see note 114
115.

supra and accompanying text.
118. See APsENuix §3 infra.

119. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 7, at 452-55; Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers Paradox, 59 A.BA.J. 1148 (1973).
120. Expenditure limitations were enacted in Florida as part of its 1913 legislation,
but these were repealed in 1949. See note 38 supra.
121. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1953). See text accompanying notes 124-126
infra.
122. Fla. Stat. §106.021(4) (1975).
123. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §4, at 633, codified as RA. STAT. 199.161(4) (1951).
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the authorization of the candidate's campaign treasurer. A suit brought under
the prior law challenged the constitutionality of this provision. In Smith v.
2
Ervin,'1
the owner of a radio station, who wished to give free time in the
furtherance of a particular candidacy, asserted that his rights of free speech
and a free press were abridged by the requirement that he had to obtain
the treasurer's permission.125 The court cited the chancellor's opinion in
stating:
I cannot see where the issue of free speech is involved at all, even if it
is, the Legislature was justified in invoking the police power to put a
curb on this evergrowing evil [of financial influence and "self-serving
segments in our system"]. Without discussing the details, this law does
not prohibit anyone from making a speech advocating the candidacy of a
candidate. The onlV thing that it does is to require that the contribution
shall be had upon the authorization of that candidate or his duly
appointed agent .

126

Thus, the effect of this statute is that no person, regardless of the extent
of his disassociation from the candidate, may provide any form of financial
support for that candidacy without the prior approval of the candidate's
agent, the campaign treasurer. 127 Clearly, this veto power over others' ability
to communicate is highly suspect. The fact that such an abridgment of free
speech is affected by a private individual is of no significance since the power
is given by a state statute?1

:8

The Smith court's failure to analyze the constitu-

tional issues is readily apparent from the language quoted above.1 29 The court
deferred to a legislative judgment concerning the potential for corruption
without studying the possibility of other undesirable effects.
The Federal Act provided the potential contributor with an alternative
to obtaining prior authorization. Any person may spend up to $1,000 with
respect "to a clearly identified candidate" without needing the candidate's
approval, 13° but a person who makes an expenditure without the candidate's
authorization must report directly to the Federal Elections Commission all
124, 64 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 195o).
125. The possibility that the Smith decision was limited only to broadcasters, who
represent a unique media, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
was negated by the existence of a companion newspaper case, Ervin v. Finlay, 64 So. 2d 175
(Fla. 1953). In Finlay, plaintiff newspaper owner presented the same question as Smith. The
Florida supreme court disposed of his suit in the same manner as Smith, citing Smith as
authority.
126. Smith v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 1953) (emphasis added).
127. The only instance when the treasurer's approval is not required is when a committee or political party makes an expenditure for the "purpose of jointly endorsing six or
more candidates." FLA. STAT. §106.021(4) (1975). No part of such an expenditure is attributable to any of the candidates either. Id. § 106.10(4). By reverse implication, a group
expenditure for less than six candidates must be allocated.
128. See generally Rosenthal, supranote 7, at 390-91.
129. The dissent was equally lax in its analysis. After quoting the chancellor's findings
on this very point of constitutionality, the dissent ignored the issue and dwelled on
whether the authorization-of-payment form constituted legal tender. See 64 So. 2d at 171-75.
130. 18 U.S.C.A. §608(e)(1) (1975).
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amounts spent in excess of $100.131 Expenditures made with the candidate's
authorization are limited by the $1,000 contribution limit 132 and also must be
reported by the candidate as part of his total expenditure allowance. 33 Allowing at least some independent expenditures is inherently less offensive to
first amendment freedoms than the proscriptions of the Florida Act, and it still
ensures that all significant expenditures are disclosed.
In Buckley, the appellants contended that the federal provision that
limits independent expenditures was unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly burdensome on the right of free expression. 13 4 In response the Court
held that as long as the provision was construed to apply only to expenditures
that advocate, in explicit terms, the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate, 35 the provision would not be invalidated for vagueness. 36 Thus,
the provision was construed so as not to affect any expenditures relating
only to campaign issues.137
On the question of whether the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures
was constitutional, the Supreme Court found no governmental interest supporting the limit that could pass "the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations
on core First Amendment rights of political expression."' 38 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had upheld this provision as a
device to prevent circumvention of the contribution limitations. 39 In reversing
that holding, the Supreme Court said that the limits on independent expenditures were so ineffective in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption that they could not be upheld against the constitutional rights
being impinged.1 4 0 Under the Court's construction of the statute,141 the provision limiting independent expenditures could be easily circumvented by a
contributor who simply avoided any express reference to a candidate. Furthermore, "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is
no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion
of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of
142
legislation."
The Buckley decision also criticized the validity of the goal of equalizing
the ability of all persons to influence the outcome of elections. As construed by
the Court, the first amendment does not permit the limitation of some in-

131. 2 U.S.C.A, §434(e) (1975). This provision was found to be constitutional in Buckley
v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 662-64 (1976). See text accompanying notes 205-212 infra.
132. 18 U.S.C.A. §608(b)(4) (1975).
133. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(b)(9) (1975).
134. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 645-47 (1976).
135. The Federal Act defines "clearly identified" as meaning "(i) the candidate's name
appears; (ii) a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or (iii) the identity of
the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference .... " 18 U.S.C.A. §608(e)(2)(A) (1975).
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 646-47 (1976).
137. Id.

138. Id. at 647.
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
.140. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 647 (1976).

141. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 648.
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dividuals' expression "in order to enhance the relative voice of others."'' 4 3 The
Court recognized that a democratic system of government depends on the
widest possible discussion of diverse ideas. 1 4 Therefore, the "First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement of free expression cannot
properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public
discussion."145

While the federal provision limited only the amount an individual could
spend independently, the Florida Act prohibits any unauthorized independent
expenditures. Clearly, the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in
Buckley to strike down limits on independent expenditures would apply to
the Florida Act's requirement of prior authorization for all expenditures. The
Florida Act should be amended to conform to the principles enunciated in
the Buckley decision. 1'"
CandidatesExpenditures
Limitations on expenditures promote the two goals of stabilizing the
total cost of an election and of equalizing the maximum financial opportunity
of the candidates to communicate with the voters. A third goal, reduction of
the potential for corruption, is not significantly affected. Also, spending
limits are antithetical to the fourth objective - disseminating the maximum
amount of information to the public -since restrictions "on the amount of
money a person or group can spend on political communication during a
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached.''1 4 7 The issue concerning the limitations on candidates'
expenditures is whether the governmental goals furthered by expenditure
limitations are sufficiently important to constitute a permissible infringement
of the first amendment right of free expression.
In testing the constitutionality of the Federal Act's limits on candidate
expenditures,148 the Buckley Court concluded not only that the constitutional
143. Id. at 649.
144. Id. at n.55. The Court noted that the fairness doctrine, upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. :367 (1969), which requires that both sides of controversial
issues be presented, could be distinguished from the instant limitations because the

former applied only to the inherently limited area of broadcast media. Cf. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down Florida's right-to-reply law,

which applied to newspapers' criticisms of political candidates).
145.
146.

Id.
See

APPENDIX §2

infra.

147. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 634-35 (1976).
148. The Federal Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §608(c) (1975), allowed each candidate, as a limit
on campaign expenditures, a choice between an absolute amount or an amount proportioned
to the number of persons of voting age in his district. The Congressional history of this
section does not clearly explain the allowance of this choice. The Bureau of the Census
can, with general accuracy, determine the voting age population of each district. A choice
of limits seems to have been offered as the result of uncertainty in determining the correlation between expenditure ceilings and the candidate's ability to reach all the voters.
The number of persons of voting age is only one relevant factor. The use of an absolute
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interest outweighed the legislative goals but also that the goals themselves
were unconstitutional. 149 Stabilizing rising campaign costs is not sufficient
justification for legislative action.
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that
spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or
unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government but the people . . . who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.50
The Supreme Court also attacked another goal of expenditure limitations 151
to equalize all the candidates' financial ability to influence the voters.
Since the funds available to a candidate merely reflect the extent of his
support, the Court emphasized that "[t]here is nothing invidious, improper,
or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate's
message to the electorate."' 152 In addition, political commentators have noted
that placing maximums on the amount of money candidates may spend fails
to equalize the candidates' influence on the voters. So many non-monetary
factors compose a candidate's attraction or vote-getting potential that equalizing
funds does nothing but accentuate the other factors. Such factors as his
public reputation, physical appearance, intelligence, issue association, and
campaign organization figure prominently in the candidate's likelihood of
success with the electorate.' 5 ' Furthermore, expenditure limits do not ensure
equal opportunities in collecting contributions. The ability to raise funds
may depend on the candidate's potential to win as perceived by contributors.
5
"Likely winners can raise more money than likely losers."'
Another reason that limiting expenditures does not equalize candidate
influence is the impact of timing. Although the amount of funds received is
important, the time at which funds are received may be critical to a campaign's
success. Expenditure limits maximize the total campaign effort but do not
prevent the candidate with initial financial support from planning his
campaign strategy with the foreknowledge of how much he has to spend. If
he is confident of his support, he can plan the times at which to spend his
money. Large amounts of money are necessary at the outset of a campaign
to hire a top professional organization, to reserve the best times for media advertisements, and to begin traveling. The candidate with initial financial
amount was based on actual amounts spent by candidates on mass media, which hypothetically reaches all the population. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1808
(1972) (views of Prouty, Griffin, et al.). Another section, 18 U.S.C.A. §608(d) (1975), provides
for readjustment of both choices each January to reflect rises in the Consumer Price Index
(published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) over the base period of 1974. The
Florida Act's expenditure limitations, §106.10, are set at absolute amounts that are subject
to effective diminution through inflation.
149.

Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652-53 (1976).

150. Id. at 653.
151. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652-53 (1976); Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 377.
152. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652-53 (1976).
153. CONG. DiGr, supra note 29, at 47, 49; Fleishman, supra note 7, at 459.
154. Fleishman, supra note 7, at 459.
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support has a significant advantage over the one who must "pound the pavement" to start the flow cf contributions because the former can present his
message to the voters sooner and more efficiently. 55 In striking down the expenditure limits, the Buckley Court recognized that the candidate who begins
as an "underdog" due to lack of public recognition, an unimpressive personal
image, or haphazard organization could counteract these initial disadvantages
by an extensive, but costly media campaign. 156
Similarly, an incumbent candidate has certain advantages over the
challenger. These include name recognition, continuous publicity of his official
acts, and staff and office subsidies. Even though none of these may be intentionally used to assist his re-election campaign, the carry-over effect is
unavoidable. 5 7 Possibly as a result of such advantages, 88 percent of the
members of the 93d Congress running for re-election in 1974 were re-elected. 158
If a challenger is well-financed, he can use his funds to overcome the incumbent's natural advantages. On the other hand, the court of appeals in
Buckley suggested that expenditure limits served to offset an incumbent's usual
ability to raise larger sums than the challenger. 59 The Supreme Court observed, however, that the effect of the $1,000 contribution limit will vary in any
given election 6 ° and that the total of contributions usually demonstrates
support for the candidate.161
In discussing expenditure limitations, the Buckley opinion considered all
four of the goals that were suggested as representing an ideal campaign
finance law. The Court found that the right of free expression contained in
the first amendment precluded legislative concern about the total costs of
elections or the amount any candidate wished to spend to communicate
with the voters,1 62 two of the goals. The third goal, maximizing the distribution of information to the public, received implicit support by the Court's
protection of the "unfettered interchange of ideas."' 6 3 Theoretically, any
reduction in available information inhibits the ability of the voter to be
informed completely and choose accordingly. However, some political analysts
have suggested that campaign advertising is ineffective because the public
is saturated by it-3 and because the average voter is not sufficiently interested
in the elections to analyze all the information he receives165 After evaluating
these three goals, the Buckley Court returned to the goal mentioned throughout their opinion as the primary concern.
155.
156.

Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
96 S. Ct. at 653. See also FLORIDA HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

158.

UNITED STATES BUREAU

ELECTIONS, supra note 6;
Adamany, supra note 1, at 3.
157. Note, supra note 36 at 306-07. For a specific list of the advantages that a Congressman in office receives, see id. at 306.
OF THE CENSUS,

STATISTICAL

ASTR-Acr

OF THE

UNITED STATES:

1975, 446 (1975).
159. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 641 (1976).
161.

Id. at 652.

162.
163.
164.
165.

See text accompanying notes 148-152 supra.
Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632 (1976).
See note 21 supra.
Interview with John French, supra note 10.
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The major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions.
The interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by the Act's contribution limitations and disclosure
provisions rather than by ... campaign expenditure ceilings. 166
holding, the Florida Act's
In light of the criticisms contained in the Buckley
167
expenditure limitations must be repealed.
THE DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING PROVISIONS

The disclosure and reporting provisions of the Florida Act are substantially
similar to provisions contained in the former law. Each candidate and political
committee must appoint a campaign treasurer, who may appoint a certain
number of deputy treasurers. 68 He must also designate a primary campaign
69
depository, which can be any bank authorized to do business in Florida. A
secondary depository may be established in each county where an election
will be held in which the candidate is participating. 7 0 After the treasurer
and depository have been designated, a candidate or political committee is
eligible to receive contributions and make expenditures. 1 No contribution
may be made on behalf of a candidate or committee unless approved by the
72
treasurer.
The treasurer must record"73 and report 7 4 the name, address, occupation,
place of business, and amount and date of money received or spent for every
contributor or recipient of an expenditure. If the contribution is less than
$100, the occupation and place of business of the contributor may be omitted
from the report." 5 Reports disclosing similar information must also be
76
filed for campaign loans and proceeds from fund raising sales and events.
Finally, there is an all-inclusive clause that requires reporting each "contribution, rebate, refund, or other receipt not otherwise listed .... .""7 One exception to the Florida Act's stringent reporting requirements, however, may be
cash contributions of less than 100. Under section 106.09, a form containing
all the required information must accompany cash contributions exceeding
$100, but that section does not specify any requirements for contributions

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 652 (1976).
See APPENDIX §6 infra.
FLA. STAT. §106.021 (1975).
Id.
Id.

171. Id. §106.021(3).
172. Id. §106.021(4).
Id. §106.06.
Id. §106.07.
Id. §106.07(4)(a).
Id. §106.07(4)(d).
177. Id. §106.07(4)(e). Committees of continuous existence, as defined in §106.04, and
political parties, affected by §106.29, have essentially the same reporting requirements.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See note 44 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/7

22

Moynahan: Florida's Campaign Finance Law: A Restoration of the Public's Con
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

of $100 or less nor does it appear to refer to the regular reporting section.-' s
Probably, though, the amount and date must be reported in order to ensure
accurate totals. An amendment would be helpful in clarifying the treasurer's
responsibility to report these lesser contributions. 17 9 Also, to achieve the goal of
relatively full disclosure, the $100 floor should be lowered. 8 0
Campaign reports must be filed quarterly up to the 40th day before the
election in which the candidate seeks nomination or election to office, thereafter, on the Monday of each week."" Unopposed candidates must file reports also, but only at the quarterly periods and on the Monday before the
election. 8 2 A final report listing the total contributions and expenditures for
the campaign is due 45 days after the election. If there are unexpended funds
83
or outstanding debts, additional status reports must be made periodically.'
Dependency of Disclosure on Public Concern
8
The reports required by the Florida Act are open to public inspection. 4
Since the average citizen lacks the time and ability to exercise this right, the
press must play a vital role in analyzing these reports vigorously and
accurately. 18 5 The press summary and dissemination of this information
enables the voters to detect special interests that have channeled their gifts
through many varied contributions. s6 When the disclosure requirements first
appeared in the 1951 law, the press was praised for its reporting.', Now,
however, the press may be less enthusiastic because the novelty of disclosure
may have worn off and the sheer mass of data makes the information
practically incomprehensible. 8 As a result, the public has a responsibility to
make disclosure effective by demanding a rigorous analysis of the candidates'
reports by the news media.

178. Thus, it appears a contributor could give ten $100 cash contributions and remain
anonymous.
179. See text accompanying notes 205-212 inIra. See also APPENDIX §§3, 5 infra.

180.

181.

Id.
FLA.

STAT.

§106.07(1) (1975).

182. Id. The prior law, Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 51-26819, §8(e), at 636, originally exempted
unopposed candidates from the obligation to file reports, but this exemption was dropped
by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-133, §2, at 457.
183. FLA. STAT. §106.07(5) (1975). The statute lends no guidance on the means by
which these balances or debts may be reduced. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
184. FLA. STAT. § 106.07(2) (1975).
185. Failure by the press to analyze the reports properly is especially misleading. In the
Interview with John French, supra note 10, Mr. French gave an example: In a particular election, a political reporter discovered that three different banking interests had contributed the
maximum $1,000 to one candidate. The resulting newspaper story reported the three contributions as a lump sum amount representing that "banking interests" were supporting this
candidate. The implication that this candidate might be disposed to certain legislation favoring banks was incorrect since, in actuality, the three interests were in conflict with each other
and each was attempting to neutralize the effect of the others.
186. Congress Watch, supra note 91, at 3; Roady, supra note 2, at 438-39.
187. Roady, supra note 2, at 438-39.
188. See notes 212-215 infra and accompanying text.
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ConstitutionalImplications
The constitutionality of disclosure provisions has been attacked in several
contexts and consistently upheld. In Burroughs v. United States,189 the
petitioners asserted that the reporting requirements of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925190 were beyond the congressional power to regulate the
elections.'"9 The Court upheld the disclosure provisions as a valid exercise of
congressional power to protect elections from the "corrupt use of money."' 192 In
a subsequent ease, the disclosure required by the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act' 9 3 was challenged as an infringement on the constitutional
rights of free speech, press, and the right to petition for redress of grievances. 9 4
The Supreme Court stated that "full realization of the American ideal of
government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on [the
people's] ability to properly evaluate such pressures."' 95 These cases were among
the authorities cited in the Buckley decision upholding the Federal Act's disclosure and reporting provisions. 99
The Buckley Court found that the governmental interests served by disclosure were sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement on the rights of privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the first
amendment1 97 Three interests were delineated. First, disclosure reveals any
special interests that support a candidate, and assists the voters in
determining the candidate's political philosophy. Second, by exposing large
contributions, the disclosure requirements "deter actual corruption and avoid
the appearance of corruption."'198 Finally, disclosure and reporting requirements provide "an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect
violations of the contribution limitations."' 99
The appellants in Buckley also contested the disclosure requirements by
arguing that disclosure discourages contributors to minority parties or unpopular causes because the potential contributors fear retaliation from their
employers, the winning party, the general public, or others. Although they
upheld the disclosure law, the Court did recognize the possibility of greater
infringement of those contributors' freedom of association. 200 The appellants'
argument was weakened, however, by the lack of any evidence showing that
the disclosure requirement had actually injured a contributor or discouraged
a significant number of potential contributors.201 Nevertheless, the Court did
189. 290 US. 543 (19.4).
190. 2 U.S.C. §§241 et seq. (1970).
191. U.S. CONST. art. H, §1.
192. 290 U.S. at 548.
193. 2 U.S.C. § §261 et seq. (1970).
194. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
195. Id. at 625.
196. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 657-58 (1976).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 657.
199. Id. at 658.
200. Id. at 657. See also Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,
74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
201. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 659-60 (1976).
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not reject this argument entirely. If a contributor to a minority party or unpopular cause can demonstrate in a future case that a "reasonable probability
[exists] that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will
subject them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either government
officials or private parties," an exemption from the disclosure requirements
would be appropriate.

20

2

In dicta, the Florida supreme court has concluded that the former disclosure statute 2 3 was valid.
The only thing [this law] does is to require that that contribution ...
shall be reported by the candidate or his treasurer and become part of
the public reports. Otherwise, how could the elector ever tell who was
behind this candidate or that; and the Legislature chose the only way
by which the contributions to campaigns could be policed ....

204

Today, the Florida Act provides for full disclosure and public inspection. In
contract, the Federal Act requires neither record-keeping of contributions of
ten dollars or less nor disclosure of persons who make contributions of less
than $100.205 While records of contributions over ten dollars are kept, reports to the Federal Elections Commission are required only for amounts of
$100 or more.2 0 6 By requiring that only contributions of $100 or more be
reported and that only these contribution records may be made public,207

the Federal Act effects a compromise between an increasing recognition of the
right of privacy and the usefulness of disclosure.208 The significant differences
between the disclosure requirements of the Florida Act and the Federal
Act provisions would probably prevent Buckley from lending any supportive
authority to the Florida law. By failing to recognize any right of privacy, the
Florida Act's disclosure provisions may be more vulnerable to a constitutional
attack.
202. Id. at 661.
203. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-133, at 457, codified as FLA. STAT. §99.161(8) (1971). However,
this section was never cited in the opinion.
204. State v. Ervin, 64 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. 1953) (quoting the chancellor's opinion).
205. 2 U.S.C.A. §432(c) (1975).
206. Id. §434(b). In this respect, the Federal Act differs slightly from the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. §241 (1970). The latter applies to all contributions but
neither act provides for public inspection of these records.
207. 2 U.S.C.A. §438(a)(4) (1975).
208. The court of appeals in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), found
that: "These audit provisions neither explicitly nor implicitly authorize disclosure by the
Commission of contribution records. Consequently, the confidential status of those records
precludes any claim of real or threatened injury to plaintiffs' First Amendment interests
In this case, the legislature dispensed with routine rearising from public disclosure ....
porting of contributions of $100 or less- an exemption that reaches a large percentage
of contributions, permits substantial participation by those concerned with political privacy,
and provides elbow room for parties to raise substantial funds from modest contributions.
In view of these considerations, we have no basis for holding that this approach by the
legislature to the complex problems involved in drawing the line exceeded the bounds
of reasonable latitude." Id. at 864-65. In affirming the court's finding, the Supreme Court
echoed the lower court's language. 96 S. Ct. at 665. See also Redish, Campaign Spending Laws
and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 900, 930-31 (1971).
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20 9
Although
The vast majority of contributors in Florida give $50 or less.
a 1961 study found the chilling effect of disclosure to be minimal, it concluded
that such an effect did exist.210 Placed in a constitutional perspective, the
21
Florida Act would benefit greatly from the use of "less drastic means." '
Setting a floor, such as ten dollars, below which only the amount of'the contribution must be reported, would probably be a constitutionally satisfactory
212
approach since no one giving less than ten dollars can exert undue influence.
A floor also reduces the amount of paperwork, which in turn alleviates some
of the problems of accounting and disclosure for the candidates, elections
commission staff, and public. 213 "Disclosure of all contributions would serve
no useful purpose; in fact, the surest way to impair the value of disclosure
requirements would be to compel the collection of data so massive as to
baffle the investigator or newspaperman." 214 Indeed, the former staff director
of the House committee that drafted the Florida Act has pointed out that
news coverage of contributions is incomplete and inaccurate now because
of the difficulty in sifting through the reports.21 5

THE ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Although the contribution and expenditure limitations and reporting
provisions of the Florida Act are designed to enable the public to ascertain
the total costs of running a campaign and the degree to which special interests
are exerting their influence, these provisions are ineffective without stringent
enforcement procedures. The establishment of such procedures was one of
the primary purposes of the Florida Act 21 6 and probably the most significant
addition to the old law.
The enforcement of these provisions is the function of three separate
bodies within the Department of State. The Division of Elections prescribes
the forms on which all the required information is to be filed, publishes
summaries and analyses of that information, and investigates alleged violations of the law.2 '7 The Division is further empowered to issue subpoenas

209. Roady, supra, note 2, at 440.
210. Id.
211. See note 88 supra.
212. See APPENDIX §3 infra.
213. Hearings, supra note 2, at 80-81; The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1975, at A22,
col. 3-5; U.S. Naws & WoRLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1972, at 42-45. Cf. Roady, supra note 2, at 44546.
214. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 406.
215. Interview with John French, supra note 10. See also note 180 supra and accompanying text. Even an avid proponent of campaign finance legislation, Senator Metcalf, wryly
observed: "Mhe complexities of [the Federal Act] suggest that the least of the worries of
those seeking office should be defeat at the polls. Where the greater risk lies today is in
winning-and then hav'ing to devote the bulk of one's time for the next two to six
'years to continuing analyiis of -campaign laws and regulations." 121 CONG. REc. §15547 (daily
ed. SepfC 9,-1975).
216. FLORmA HousE COMMrrrEE ON ELEctiONs, 'supra note 6, at Summary.
217. FLA. STAT. §106.22 (1975).
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and render advisory opinions on the various provisions of the Florida Act. 218
Any citizen of the state may file a sworn complaint with the Division alleging
a violation, 219 but a criminal penalty is imposed on anyone who knowingly
files a false complaint.22 The Division must initiate its investigation within
72 hours of the time the complaint is made and "report its findings to the
Department of State for further action." 221 If the Department of State decides
there is a sufficient basis for the allegation, it convenes the Elections Com222
mission for further proceedings.
The Elections Commission, a seven-member body created by the Florida
Act, functions as a sort of grand jury. 22 3 The Elections Commission must begin
hearings within 72 hours of convening to determine if probable cause exists
to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred and to recommend
disposition of the case.2 24 These proceedings are held in closed session and
penalties are imposed for disclosure.2 25 If the Elections Commission finds
probable cause, the case is then turned over to the Department of Legal
2 26
Affairs for the appropriate legal action.
Although the purpose of separating these enforcement functions was to
create a system of checks and balances, 22 7 this separation appears unnecessarily
inefficient in the utilization of the State's resources. The Elections Commission
and Department of Legal Affairs must wait for cases to filter through the
Division of Elections before they can act. With the variety of duties the
Division has, 228 it cannot devote enough time to investigations to avoid bottlenecks. An alternative method is exemplified by the Federal Elections Commission, which performs the same duties as the Florida Division of Elections
and Florida Elections Commission.2 29 Federal investigators can follow a case
218. Id. §106.23.
219. Id. §106.25(1).
220. Id. §106.25(5).
221. Id. §106.25(1).
222. FLA. STAT. §106.25(2) reads, in pertinent part: "Whenever, in the judgment of
the Department of State, any candidate . . . has engaged in any act or practice which
constitutes a violation of this chapter . . . the Department of State shall convene the
Elections Commission .... "
223. Six of these members are appointed by the governor with cabinet approval from
lists submitted by the two major political parties in the state. They serve four-year terms
and may succeed themselves. The six submit a list of persons from whom the governor
appoints a Commission Chairman. FLA. STAT. §106.24(1).
224. FLA. STAT. §106.25(3) (1975).
225. Id. §106.25(4).
226. Id. §106.27.
227. Interview with John French, supra note 10.
228. These duties are enumerated in FLA. STAT. §106.22 (1975).
229. The Buckley decision held that the commingling of informative, investigative,
and administrative powers in one body, the Federal Elections Commission, would not violate
the separation of powers doctrine but, as that body is presently chosen, exercise of all of
those powers would violate the appointments clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§2, cl. 2. That clause requires the Executive to appoint all officers of the United States;
under the Federal Act, 2 U.S.C.A. §437(c)(a)(1) (1975), the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed four of the six voting
members of the Commission. 96 & Ct. at 687-93.
A similar commingling of powers in the Florida Elections Commission would not en-
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from the initial complaint to the commencement of legal action. If enacted
in Florida, such a system would also eliminate the dual probable cause
hearings, the first of which is so ambiguous as to be meaningless and is yet
230
another obstacle in the bottleneck preventing efficient enforcement.
The Florida Act provides stringent penalties for violations. Any candidate,
committee chairman, or treasurer who knowingly and willfully accepts an
illegal contribution, makes an illegal expenditure, or fails to report or falsely
reports any required information may be subject to criminal and civil
penalties. Section 106.19 makes such an act punishable as a misdemeanor in
the first degree 231 and by a fine equal to three times the amount involved in
the illegal act, payable to the state's general revenue. In addition, a candidate
convicted of violating these provisions may have his name taken off the ballot
prior to the election, may be refused his certificate of election, or may have
his certificate rescinded. 2s 2 An office thus vacated would be filled by a special
election or appointment.233 If a corporation is found guilty of a violation, it
may be fined up to $10,000 and, if incorporated in Florida, ordered to be
dissolved. 23 4 Actions for violations of the Florida Act must be commenced
23 5
within two years from the date of violation.
Several amendments to the penalties provided by the Florida Act would
effectuate better enforcement. First, the list of persons to whom the sanctions
apply fails to include persons who make political expenditures but are unconnected with a campaign. Abuses by these persons would be just as severe
as any violation by a candidate and should be subject to the same penalties.
Application of the law to these persons could be achieved by a simple amendment. 230 Second, the Florida Act's penalties are absolute and thus seem
unduly stringent. An official who feels that an alleged violation is de
minimis may not pursue the investigation. 2 7 The Federal Act provides for
discretion in the amounts of fines 238 and allows the Federal Elections Commission to "endeavor to correct such violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" 239 before resorting to legal action. The

counter the constitutional problem raised in Buckley. While the Florida Constitution has
a somewhat similar appointments clause, art. IV, §1(a), the Florida Act, in accordance with
the appointments clause, assigns to the governor the power to appoint all members of the
Commission. See note 223 supra.
230. See APPENDIX §8 infra.
231. If the chairman of the executive committee of a political party or treasurer
of a committee of continuous existence is guilty of any of the sanctioned acts, his violation
is a third degree felony. FLA. STAT. §§106.04(4)(d), .29(2) (1975).
232. FLA. STAT. §106.1.8 (1975).
233. See FLA. STAT. §§106.18 ,106.21, 114.01(8), 114.04, 100.101, 100.111 (1975).
234. FLA. STAT. §§106.08(4), 607.271(b) (1975). A corporation, however, may be able
to assert ultra vires as a defense. Id. §607.021 (1975).
235. Id. §106.28 (1975).
236. Id. §7.
237. See Hearings,supra note 2, at 67 (Statement of Phillip S. Hughes, Director, Office
of Federal Elections).
238. 18 U.S.CA. §608(i) (1975).
239. 2 U.S.C.A. §437g(a)(5) (1975).
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addition of this discretion to the Florida Act would promote the exercise of
sanctions against candidates accused of only minor violations.240
The tripartite system established by the Florida Act represents a practical
means of enforcing the contribution and expenditure limitations and disclosure requirements. However, a more efficient distribution of the functions
of the three bodies would substantially improve the overall procedure. By
placing the primary responsibility for receiving and investigating complaints
of alleged violations on the Elections Commission, the Florida Act would
ensure no duplication of efforts or waste of resources. The Division of Elections
would receive and analyze campaign finance reports, the Elections Commission
would investigate complaints, and the Department of Legal Affairs would
prosecute violations. This allocation of duties also preserves the Florida Act's
intent to provide a system of internal checks and balances. Such a distribution of functions, with provisions for the type of discretion allowed by the
Federal Act, would form a more comprehensible and effective mode of enforcement.
CONCLUSION

The rising costs of political campaigns, resulting from inflation, greater
use of expensive media, and more competition, have led to a belief on the
part of the public that only the wealthy or well-connected candidates can
be successful. At the same time, the need for substantial campaign funds has
resulted in numerous scandals, which causes the public to doubt further the
integrity of the electoral system and the persons who hold office. Regulation
of campaign financing that limits any one interest's influence and discloses to
the public the multitude of financial influences on the election is viewed as a
panacea for growing public cynicism.
The Florida Campaign Finance Act of 1973 attempted to meet these
goals. The Florida Act sets limits on contributions and expenditures and
requires full public disclosure of the sources and uses of these funds. It
also provides a system by which to enforce compliance and penalize violations.
Although the constitutionality of the Florida law has not yet been tested, the
Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the contribution limits and disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act but declared unconstitutional the expenditure limitations. The constitutional right of free
expression so strongly reaffirmed in Buckley requires that the expenditure
limits imposed on candidates and noncandidates by the Florida Act be
repealed.
Furthermore, a close scrutiny of the Florida law reveals the desirability of
certain amendments in the interest of clarity. Suggestions for these amendments, made throughout this note, are appended in the form of a legislative
proposal. Some provisions are added to supplement the sections pertaining
to contributions. For example, the contribution limits should apply, after a
reasonable point, to the amount of incidental expenditures incurred by
volunteers while rendering services. Another provision allows the candidate
240. See

APPENDIX

§7 infra.
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or political committee to use unexpended contributions for any reasonable
purpose. The disclosure requirements could be improved by two amendments. The Buckley decision recognized the Value of the privacy accorded to
small contributors by the threshold that the Federal Act places on its
reporting requirements; a threshold of a $10 contribution to trigger the
reporting requirements is suggested for the Florida Act. Second, since expenditures by noncandidates for political objectives may not be limited, a
requirement that noncandidates report their expenditures directly to the
Elections Commission would implement more effectively the purposes of disclosure. Another amendment making the penalties for violations discretionary
and placing primary investigatory responsibilities upon the Elections Commission would make enforcement easier and more efficient. Of the several goals
sought to be achieved by ideal campaign finance regulation, only the desire to
reduce the potential of corruption by large contributors can be achieved
realistically and constitutionally. With certain amendments to its present
contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and enforcement procedures,
the Florida Campaign Finance Act will play a leading role in restoring public
confidence in the integrity of the state electoral system.
JoHN

H. MOYNAHAN, JR.

APPENDIX

CoDo: Roman type indicates no changes; underlined type indicates deletions; italicized

type indicates additions.
A BILL
An Act relating to campaign financing; amending various subsections of the Florida
Campaign Finance Act of 1973 (Fla. Stat. §§106.011 et seq. (1973)); repealing §106.10
relating to limitations on campaign expenditures; revising §§106.24-106.27 relating to
the respective powers and duties of the division of elections and elections commission.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Subsection (3) of §106.011, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
106.011 Definitions-As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the
following meanings unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(3) "Contribution" means:
(a) A gift, subscription, conveyance, deposit, payment, loan, or distribution of money
or anything of value, including contributions in kind having an attributable monetary value
in any form, made with the campaign treasurer'sauthorizationfor the purpose of influencing
the results of an election.
(b)

...

(C)

...

Notwithstanding the foregoing meanings of "contribution," the word shall not be
construed to include the services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering
a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or political committee or the
value of any expenditures by any such individual volunteer incurred in rendering services
to that candidate or political committee except to the extent that the aggregate of those
expenditures exceeds $100.
Section 2. Subsection (4) of §106.021, requiring authorizittiQn by the campaign tr~esurer

of all contributions and expenditures, is repealed.
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Section 3. Section 106.07, Florida Statutes, is amended as follows:
106.07 Reports; certification and filing
(1) Each campaign treasurer designated by a candidate or political committee pursuant
to §106.021 shall file regular reports of all contributions received and all expenditures made
by or on behalf of such candidate or political committee, except those expenditures made
without the treasurer's authorization pursuant to §106.07(4). Reports shall be filed on the
first Monday ....

(2) ...
() ...
(4) Any person other than a candidate or political committee who makes an expenditure
in excess of ten dollars ($10) without the authorization of a campaign treasurer shall report
that expenditure to the elections commission within seven (7) days from the time the
expenditure was made. Such report shall contain the same information required under
§106.07(5).
(4) Renumbered as (5). (5) Each report required by this section shall contain the
following information:
(2) The full name, residence, if any, mailing address, occupation, and principal place
of business, if any, of each person who has made one or more contributions to or for
such committee or candidate within the reporting period, together with the amount and
date of such contributions. However, if the contribution is less than one hundred dollars
($100) ten dollars ($10), the occupation and principal place of business of the contributor
need not be listed, and only the name, residence, if any, and mailing address is necessary
only the amount and date of such contribution need be listed;
(b) ...
(c)

...

(d) ...
(e) ...
(f) ...
(g)

...

(h) ...
(i)
(k) ...
(5) Renumbered as (6). (i) A final report shall be filed forty-five days after the last
election in a given election year in which a candidate or political committee participates.
If such final statement shows an unexpected balance of contributions, the campaign treasurer
of the candidate or political committee shall file . . . and an additional supplemental statement shall be filed every sixty days until the account shows no unexpended balance of
contributions. Any unexpended balance of contributions shall accrue to the candidate or
political committee to be lawfully used for any official or charitable purpose. If such final
statement shows ....
(6) Renumbered as (7).
(7) Renumbered as (8).
Section 4. Subsection (1) of §106.08, Florida Statutes, is amended as follows:
106.08 Contributions; limitations on
(1) (a) No person or political committee shall make contributions to any candidate or
political committee in this state, in moneys, material, or supplies or by way of loan, in
excess of the following amounts:
(a) through (f) Renumbered as 1 through 6.
(1) (b) The contribution limits provided in paragraphs (a) 1 through (f)6 shall not
apply to contributions made by political parties regulated by chapter 103, Florida Statutes,
or to expenditures made directly by any political committee for obtaining time, space, or
services in or by any communications media for the purpose of jointly endorsing six or
more candidates. The limitations provided by this subsection (a) shall apply to each
election in which a candidate or political committee participates ....
Section 5. Section 106.09, Florida Statutes, is amended as follows:
106.09 Receipts for cash contributions
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(1) No person shall make a cash contribution in excess of one hundred dollars ($100)
ten dollars ($10) unless the contribution is accompanied by a contribution statement on a
form approved by the Division of Elections Elections Commission. Such statement shall
contain the following information:
(a) _
(b) ...
(C) .
(d) ...
(e) ...
f)
..
(2) It shall be the duty of each candidate or each political committee to furnish in
triplicate the form described in subsection (1) to each person contributing cash in excess
of one hundred dollars ($100) ten dollars ($10). One copy...
(3) ...
Section 6. Section 106.10, Florida Statutes, relating to limitations on expenditures, is
repealed.
Section 7. Section 106.19, Florida Statutes, is amended as follows:
106.19 Violations by candidates, political committees, campaign treasurer
(1) Any candidate, campaign treasurer or deputy treasurer of any candidate, or committee
chairman, vice-chairman, campaign treasurer, or deputy treasurer of any political committee,
or any other person who knowingly and willfully:
(a) ...
(b) ...
(C) ...
(d) Repealed.
(e) Renumbered as (d).
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree and punished as provided in §775.082
and §775.083.
. (2) Any candidate, campaign treasurer, or deputy treasurer or any chairman or vicechairman of any political committee, or any other person, who violates paragraphs
(a), (b), (d), or through (d) of subsection (1) shall may be subject to a civil penalty up to
an amount equal to three (3) times the amount involved in the illegal act.
Section 8. Sections 106.24 through 106.27, Florida Statutes, are amended as follows:
106.24 Florida elections commission; membership; powers; duties
(1) ...

(2)

...

(3) The Commission shall convene at the call of its chairman or at the call of the
Department of State. The presence of five members is required to constitute a quorum ....
(4)

...

106.25 Reports of alleged violations to department of state Elections Commission;
disposition of findings
(I) Any citizen of the state having information of any violation of this chapter may
file a sworn complaint with the division of elections chairman of the Elections Commission,
with a copy being filed with the chairman of the Elections Commission Division of Elections. For purposes of this subsection, the Division of Elections shall be deemed a "citizen
of the state" with regard to information of possible violations obtained from its audits and
investigations of reports received pursuant to §106.22. If the complaint alleges violations by
a candidate for federal, state or legislative office, including all judicial offices, by a political
committee supporting any such candidate, by the state executive committee of any political
party, or by a political committee advocating the acceptance or rejection of an issue to be
voted upon in a statewide election, the division Commission shall investigate the allegations contained in the complaint and report its findings to the department of state for
further action as provided in subsection (2). If the complaint alleges violations by a
candidate for any other office chosen at an election, by any political committee supporting
such a candidate, by any county executive committee advocating the acceptance or rejection
of an issue voted upon on less than a statewide basis, the Division Commission shall forward

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/7

32

Moynahan:
Florida's Campaign Finance Law: A Restoration of the Public's Con
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXVIII

a copy of the complaint to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged
violation occurred. If the complaint alleges violations in a campaign in which the incumbent
state attorney is a candidate, the Division of Elections Commission shall investigate the
allegations and report its findings to the Department of State for further action as provided in
subsection (2). It shall be the duty of a state attorney receiving a complaint pursuant to
this subsection promptly and thoroughly to investigate the allegations contained therein
and to file a full report of the investigation and proposed disposition of the complaint
with the Division of Elections Commission. If the Commission determines, after investigation,
that there is reason to believe that any person has engaged, or is about to engage in any
acts or practices which constitute a violation of this Act, the Commission may endeavor to
correct such violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. If
the Commission fails to correct the violation through informal methods, when the results
of the investigation indicate that a violation of the chapter has occurred, the state attorney
may immediately proceed with such civil and criminal actions provided by this chapter as
are justified by the facts of the situation. Each complaint received by the Division
Commission shall be kept confidential until such time as the Department of State Commission
concludes that disposition of such complaint has occurred pursuant to this chapter, at
which time such complaint and all relevant reports and recommendations shall become
matters of public record. The Division Commission shall initiate appropriate investigative
or referral action on each complaint within seventy-two (72) hours (Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays excluded). Nothing contained in this subsection shall be deemed to preclude
the Division of Elections Commission from investigating any possible violations of this
chapter that come to its knowledge other than by means of a sworn complaint.
(2) Repealed.
(3) Repealed.
(2) The Commission shall hold hearings in the manner provided by this chapter to
determine if probable cause exists to believe that a violation of this chapter has occurred.
The Commission is specifically required to hear any allegation relating to any currently
serving public official regarding his utilization of public or private funds to further his
future candidacy prior to the time period prescribed in §106.15 or regarding any violations
of §106.19.
(4) Renumbered as 106.26(12).
(5) Renumbered as (3).
106.251 Reports of alleged violations to Department of Legal Affairs; investigations;
disposition of findings.
Repealed.
106.26 Powers of commission; rights and responsibilities of parties; findings by commission
(1) ...
(2) ..
(3) ..
(4) ..
(5) ..
(6)
(7) ...
(8) ...
(9) ...

(10)

...

(11) ...
(12) All proceedings of the Commission dealing with consideration of alleged violations
shall be in closed session attended only by those persons, including the attorney or
attorneys for the party allegedly violating this chapter, necessary to the transaction of the
affairs of the commission. Any person who discloses any testimony, finding, or other transactions of the Commission occurring in closed session except as provided herein or unless
ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
in the first degree and punished as provided in §775,082 or §775.083.
(12) Renumbered as (13).
(13) Renumbered as (14).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

33

